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INTRODUCTION 
xploration and collection of marine genetic resources (“MGRs”) 
has led to the identification of more than 15,000 molecules.1 As a 
result of these discoveries, the number of international claims for marine 
gene patents deposited between 1991 and 2009 reached 677, and dozens 
of products based on deep-sea organisms have been patented.2 With 95% 
of marine gene patent claims filed after 2000, the growth of the field can 
be considered a recent phenomenon.3 
Deep-sea marine organisms (bacteria, animals, plants, seaweeds, etc.) 
live in particular environments that do not have a close equivalent in ter-
restrial ecosystems. These organisms can resist, for example, high pres-
sure, elevated temperature, and the absence of sunlight.4 Due to such 
unique characteristics, MGRs deriving from such organisms have shown 
great potential in the field of medicine and are considered of significant 
value for future research and developments. Potential fields of applica-
tion for MGRs include antioxidant, antifungal, anti-HIV, antibiotic, anti-
cancer, antituberculosis, and antimalarial uses.5 Major pharmaceutical 
firms, including Merck, Lilly, Pfizer, Hoffman-Laroche, and Bristol-
Myers Squibb, have marine biology departments.6 At least nine compa-
nies are currently involved in research and development of biotechnolo-
gy on MGRs.7 The global market for marine biotechnology was estimat-
ed at $2.4 billion in 2004, with an estimated average growth of 5.9% per 
year from 1999 to 2007.8 According to the results of International Census 
                                                                                                             
 1. Kirsten E. Zewers, Bright Future for Marine Genetic Resources, Bleak Future for 
Settlement of Ownership Rights: Reflections on the United Nations Law of the Sea Con-
sultative Process on Marine Genetic Resources, 5 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 151, 152 
(2008) (citing U.N. Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Rep of the Secre-
tary-General, ¶ 127, U.N. Doc. A/62/66 (Mar. 12, 2007)). 
 2. Sophie Arnaud-Haond, Jesús M. Arrieta, & Carlos M. Duarte, Global Genetic 
Resources: Marine Biodiversity and Gene Patents, 331 SCIENCE 1521, 1521 (Mar. 25, 
2011). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Sergio Beslier, The Protection and Sustainable Exploitation of Genetic Resources 
of the High Seas from the European Union’s Perspective, 24 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL 
L. 335 (2009). 
 5. Fernando de la Calle, Marine Genetic Resources: A Source of New Drugs: The 
Experience of the Biotechnology Sector, 24 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 209 (2009). 
 6. Zewers, supra note 1, at 156–58. 
 7. Resources, MARINEBIOTECH.ORG, http://www.marinebiotech.org/links.html (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2011). 
 8. Douglas Westwood Ltd., Marine Industries Global Market Analysis, 1 MARINE 
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of Marine Microbes, “the value of the ecosystem services provided by 
coral reefs is estimated at more than $5 million per square kilometer per 
year, in terms of revenues from genetic material and bioprospecting.”9 
Bioprospecting refers to the “scientific investigation of living organisms 
for commercially valuable genetic and biochemical resources”10 and in-
cludes the research, collection, and utilization of biological and genetic 
resources with the aim of applying the derived knowledge for scientific 
and/or commercial purposes.11 
Despite the field’s growth, claims associated with marine genes have 
so far originated from only thirty-one countries in the world, and 90% of 
the deposited patents arise only from ten counties, with 70% from the 
United States, Germany, and Japan.12 This is because scientific research 
related to deep seabed and high seas genetic resources is restricted to 
those few operators who have the necessary technological capacity and 
financial resources. Up to now, few countries have produced the neces-
sary capital, technology, and scientific expertise to obtain MGRs. Due to 
the high costs involved, developed countries enjoy an effective monopo-
ly on the necessary elements for research, and subsequently on the 
MGRs that they collect.13 
From a legal point of view, it is unclear under which regime MGRs fall 
and under what conditions they can be patented. Three main legal in-
struments contribute to the parameters of their legal regime: the United 
                                                                                                             
 9. U.N. Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea: Rep of the Secretary-
General, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. A/62/66 (Mar. 12, 2007) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General, 
Oceans Rep.]. More than 2,700 scientists, from 80 different countries, put 10 years effort 
together in order to realize the most precise and reliable census of marine life. For more 
information on marine life, discovery and research, see CENSUS OF MARINE LIFE, 
http://www.coml.org (last visited Oct. 1, 2011). 
 10. Louise A. de La Fayette, A New Regime for the Conservation and Sustainable 
Use of Marine Biodiversity and Genetic Resources Beyond the Limits of National Juris-
diction, 24 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 221, 228 (2009); Andree Kirchner, Bio-
prospecting, Marine Scientific Research and the Patentability of Genetic Resources, in 
SERVING THE RULE OF INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR 
DAVID JOSEPH ATTARD 119 (Norman A. Martínez Gutiérrez ed., 2010). 
 11. K. TEN KATE & S.A. LAIRD, THE COMMERCIAL USE OF BIODIVERSITY 19 (1999). 
 12. Arnaud-Haond et al., supra note 2, at 1521. 
 13. SALVATORE ARICO & CHARLOTTE SALPIN, BIOPROSPECTING OF GENETIC 
RESOURCES IN THE DEEP SEABED: SCIENTIFIC, LEGAL AND POLICY ASPECTS 15 (U.N. Univ. 
& Inst. of Advanced Studies 2005), available at 
http://www.ias.unu.edu/binaries2/DeepSeabed.pdf; David Leary, International Law and 
Genetic Resources of the Deep Sea, in LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE FOR OCEANS IN 
GLOBALISATION 353 (Davor Vidas ed., 2010); de La Fayette, supra note 10, at 277. 
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Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”),14 the Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity (“CBD”),15 and the Trade Related Intellec-
tual Property Rights Agreement (“TRIPS”).16 As a preliminary remark, it 
must be highlighted that while UNCLOS does not specifically address 
MGRs, it does provide that the deep seabed, as it lies beyond national 
jurisdiction, is subject to the common heritage of mankind regime,17 
managed by the International Seabed Authority (“the Authority”).18 
However, the water column beyond national jurisdiction is part of the 
high seas regime and subject to the freedoms of the high seas, e.g., inter 
alia the freedoms of navigation and of scientific research.19 There is con-
siderable disagreement as to whether MGRs are or should be included in 
the Authority’s jurisdiction and whether they come under the “common 
heritage of mankind” regime. 
Even if MGRs are not directly part of the common heritage regime, 
their conservation and exploitation constitute common concerns because 
they are located in areas beyond national jurisdiction. MGRs should 
therefore enjoy protection in line with the existing legal instruments con-
cerning common interests, such as biodiversity and genetic resources for 
food and agriculture. In this light, this Article suggests that the exploita-
tion of MGRs should be carried out according to two fundamental prin-
ciples that are enshrined in the CBD: (i) the prior and informed consent 
to access to MGRs and (ii) the fair and equitable sharing of benefits from 
these resources. 
It stands to question whether the existing international regulation of in-
tellectual property rights (“IPRs”), specifically patents, as set out by 
TRIPS, is compatible with these two principles and, more generally, with 
the complex legal regime of MGRs. According to TRIPS, the grant of 
patents is conditioned on technical requirements, none of which concern 
the prior and informed consent to access and the fair and equitable shar-
ing of benefits. Given this lack of consistency between legal regimes, the 
World Trade Organization’s (“WTO”) Doha Ministerial Declaration 
charged the TRIPS Council with the task of examining the relationship 
                                                                                                             
 14. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 15. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 [hereinafter 
CBD]. 
 16. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, 869 
U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 17. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 136. 
 18. Id. art. 137, ¶ 2. 
 19. Id. art. 87. 
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between TRIPS and the CBD.20 A group of fifty-two WTO members 
seemed to have reached a compromise in July 2008 when it agreed to 
implement a “disclosure of origin clause,” i.e., the grant of a patent con-
ditioned on disclosure of the source of the material upon which the in-
vention is based, as a requirement for patent application.21 Such an 
amendment would have important implications on MGRs exploitation, 
since the grant of patents would be subject to the CBD principles, which 
are, in our view, jointly with UNCLOS ones, the principles framing the 
MGRs legal regime. However, the amendment’s current feasibility is 
definitively uncertain, due to the subsequent regression in the negotia-
tions. 
In view of these three overlapping legal regimes, any attempt at regu-
lating the management and the exploitation of MGRs stands within the 
wider debate on the fragmentation of international law.22 This Article 
will demonstrate that the different legal regimes likely operate in support 
of one another to create a workable legal regime for MGRs. Compatibil-
ity clauses and recent normative developments in each regime testify to 
an interdependent relationship between UNCLOS, the CBD, and TRIPS. 
In short, legal quarrels relating to the management and exploitation of 
MGRs illustrate an inter-systemic dialogue and the need of such dialogue 
in order to form a coherent legal framework for MGRs.23 
                                                                                                             
 20. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶ 19, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41I.L.M. 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
 21. Trade Negotiations Comm., Draft Modalities for TRIPS Related Issues, 
T/NC/W52 (July 18, 2008). 
 22. On this topic, see also Int’l Law Comm’n, Fragmentation of International Law, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 13, 2006); Eyal Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The 
Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 595 (2007); Benedetto Conforti, Unité et fragmentation du droit inter-
national: “glissez, mortels, n’appuyez pas!” [Unity and Fragmentation of International 
Law: “Thus Lightly Touch and Quickly Go!”], 111 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 5 (2007) (Fr.); Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner, 
Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global 
Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 999 (2004); Duncan French, Treaty Interpretation and the In-
corporation of Extraneous Legal Rules, 55 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 300 (2006). See generally 
Symposium, Post-ILC Debate on Fragmentation of International Law, 17 FINNISH Y.B. 
INT’L L. (2006); Tullio Treves, Fragmentation of International Law: the Judicial Per-
spective, 23 COMUNICAZIONI E STUDI 821 (2007). 
 23. On the interdependence and theoretical debates of legal regimes, see generally 
Lorenzo Gradoni, Systèmes juridiques internationaux: une esquisse [International Legal 
Systems: A Sketch], in LA CIRCULATION DES CONCEPTS JURIDIQUES: LE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL DE L’ENVIRONNEMENT ENTRE MONDIALISATION ET FRAGMENTATION 27 
(Hélène Ruiz Fabri & Lorenzo Gradoni eds., 2009) (Fr.); Bruno Simma, Self-Contained 
Regimes, 16 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 111 (1985); Bruno Simma & Dirk Pyulkowski, Of 
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The following analysis is divided into two sections. The first part aims 
at identifying the principles and rules governing MGRs’ overall legal 
regime by demonstrating how the management and exploitation of 
MGRs falls within several legal systems. It analyzes (A) the legal status 
of MGRs in the light of UNCLOS, (B) the patentability of inventions 
derived from MGRs in the light of TRIPS, and (C) MGRs’ access and 
commercial exploitation in the light of the CBD. It concludes that exist-
ing instruments, if considered and applied in isolation, are incomplete 
and inefficient to deal with MGRs. The second part explores alternative 
legal solutions as well as institutional mechanisms of coping with the 
management of MGRs. To this extent, it will analyze four legal solutions 
based on the joint application of existing legal tools, and three possible 
institutional scenarios that guarantee the principles of protection and the 
“common” management of MGRs. 
I. A LEGAL REGIME FOR MGRS: FRAGMENTATION AND COORDINATION 
BETWEEN EXISTING REGIMES 
A. The Applicability and Limitations of UNCLOS 
UNCLOS was adopted by the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea on December 10, 1982, and entered into force on No-
vember 16, 1994.24 Currently, 161 states are party to UNCLOS. Consid-
ered the “Constitution for the oceans,” UNCLOS, as declared by the 
U.N. General Assembly and repeatedly confirmed by states, “sets out the 
legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must 
be carried out.”25 Thus, it is imperative to identify where MGRs fall un-
der UNCLOS provisions, considering the related context and subsequent 
practice.26 
UNCLOS does not contain any provision explicitly regulating MGRs 
and it does not use the expression “area beyond national jurisdiction.”27 
Rather, it provides that areas beyond the national jurisdiction of coastal 
states are either part of the high seas regime or of the “Area of the deep 
seabed.” Article 86 stipulates that “[t]he provisions of this Part [Part VII 
                                                                                                             
Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 483 (2006). 
 24. UNCLOS, supra note 14. 
 25. See Oceans and the Law of the Sea, G.A. Res. 62/215, U.N. Doc. A./RES/62/215 
(Dec. 22, 2008). 
 26. Treaties are “living instruments.” See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 60th Sess., 
May 5–June 6, July 7–Aug. 8, 2008, U.N. Doc. A/63/10; GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 10, 
Annex A, at 365 (2008). 
 27. See generally UNCLOS, supra note 14. 
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High Seas] apply to all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclu-
sive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a 
State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.”28 High seas 
are the water column not included in areas submitted to coastal states’ 
jurisdiction29 and superjacent the Area of the deep seabed and, eventual-
ly, the continental shelf.30 The floor and the subsoil of the areas beyond 
national jurisdiction fall under the Area31 regulated by Part XI of 
UNCLOS.32 This distinction creates one of the elemental problems when 
applying UNCLOS to MGRs—their locale is not easily ascertainable. 
For instance, how does one determine in which of the two regimes a mi-
crobe living in symbiosis with the local fauna falls, or perhaps a microbe 
found in the proximity of a thermal vent? It is, however, important to 
outline the main characteristics of both regimes in order to foresee the 
legal framework that might regulate MGRs and related issues. 
“The Area”—the floor and the subsoil of areas beyond national juris-
diction—is subject to the regime of the “common heritage of mankind.”33 
The common heritage of mankind was first introduced by the Maltese 
representative, Arvid Pardo, in a speech in front of the U.N. General As-
sembly in 1967.34 In 1970, the General Assembly adopted a resolution, 
declaring that “[t]he sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction . . . as well as the resources of 
the area, are the common heritage of mankind.”35 In those years, the op-
timism concerning technological developments fuelled the rise of a re-
gime promoting a New International Economic Order36 (which conveys 
                                                                                                             
 28. Id. art. 86 (emphasis added). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. art. 76, ¶ 1. 
 31. The Area is considered the floor and the subsoil of areas beyond national jurisdic-
tion. Id. art. 1, ¶ 1. 
 32. Id. arts. 133–91. 
 33. Id. art. 136. 
 34. U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., 1516th mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1516 (Nov. 1, 
1967). 
 35. Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the 
Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749 (XXV), U.N. 
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2749 (XXV) (Dec. 17, 1970). 
 36. In the 1960s and 1970s, the countries with newfound independence from their 
colonial occupier considered colonialism as an avatar of capitalism. DENIS BENN, 
MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY AND THE ECONOMICS OF CHANGE 1–3 (2003). For this reason 
they claimed a new international economic order that will help solve the inequalities 
between developing and developed states, which translates to the difference between the 
new independent states and the former colonial powers. Id.; see also Muthucumaraswa-
my Sornarajah, The New World Economic Order and Equity, in DYNAMICS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 209 (R.K. Dixit & C. Jayaraj eds., 2004). 
194 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 37:1 
the idea of equity in economic relations).37 This is reflected in Article 
137 on the legal status of the Area and its resources: 
1. No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over 
any part of the Area or its resources, nor shall any State or natural or ju-
ridical person appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise 
of sovereignty or sovereign rights nor such appropriation shall be rec-
ognized. 
2. All rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a 
whole, on whose behalf the Authority shall act. These resources are not 
subject to alienation. 
. . . . 
3. No State or natural or juridical person shall claim, acquire or exer-
cise rights with respect to the minerals recovered from the Area except 
in accordance with this Part.38 
When UNCLOS was negotiated, the only resources in the Area taken 
into consideration were mineral resources whose economic potential, 
even if exaggerated,39 was of great interest for both developed and de-
veloping countries.40 The existence of living resources in the Area and 
their possible economic value was unknown at that time. As a result, Ar-
ticle 133 defines resources as “all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral re-
sources in situ in the Area at or beneath the seabed, including polymetal-
lic nodules.”41 This narrow definition of the resources has led some to 
posit that the common heritage of mankind regime does not apply to 
MGRs.42 Another reason for the nonapplication of the common heritage 
regime to MGRs is that the exploitation and management of the re-
sources would be accompanied by the Authority’s position in a leading 
                                                                                                             
 37. Luigi Migliorino, Sfruttamento dei fondi marini e nuovo ordine economico inter-
nazionale, trasferimento della tecnologia e controllo delle multinazionali [Exploitation of 
the Seabed and New International Economic Order, Transfer of Technology and Control 
of Multinational Corporations], in LO SFRUTTAMENTO DEI FONDI MARINI 81, 82 (Tullio 
Treves et al. eds., 1982) (It.); Jutta Brunnée, Common Areas, Common Heritage and 
Common Concern, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
550, 561–62 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007). 
 38. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 137. 
 39. Lyle Glowka, Evolving Perspectives on the International Seabed Area’s Genetic 
Resources: Fifteen Years after the “Deepest of Ironies,” in LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND 
SCIENCE, supra note 13, at 397; DAVID LEARY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE GENETIC 
RESOURCES OF THE DEEP SEA 47 (2007). 
 40. Migliorino, supra note 37, at 84–85. 
 41. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 133(a). 
 42. LEARY, INTERNATIONAL LAW & DEEP SEA GENETIC RESOURCES, supra note 39, at 
47. 
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role, but the Authority features a composition that is potentially ill-suited 
for the management of MGRs.43 The principal organ of the Authority, the 
Council, is composed of member states’ representatives, in particular 
those states that have a leading role in the polymetallic nodules indus-
try.44 These groups may lack sufficient motivation or qualifications to 
protect MGRs and the related industry. 
Despite Part XI’s narrow definition of resources within the purposes of 
the common heritage regime, the limited language does not preclude Part 
XI and the Authority from governing MGRs. Applicable portions are 
                                                                                                             
 43. Tullio Treves, Principles and Objectives of the Legal Regime Governing Areas 
Beyond Nation Jurisdiction, in THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME OF AREAS BEYOND 
NATIONAL JURISDICTION: CURRENT AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS 7, 17–18 (Erik J. Mo-
lenaar & Alex G. Oude Elferink eds., 2010) [hereinafter Treves, Principles and Objec-
tives]. 
 44. Pursuant to Article 161, ¶ 1 of UNCLOS, the Council consists of thirty-six mem-
bers: 
(a) four members from among those States Parties which, during the last five 
years for which statistics are available, have either consumed more than [2%] 
of total world consumption or have had net imports of more than [2%] of total 
world imports of the commodities produced from the categories of minerals to 
be derived from the Area, and in any case one State from the Eastern European 
(Socialist) region, as well as the largest consumer;  
(b) four members from among the eight States Parties which have the largest 
investments in preparation for and in the conduct of activities in the Area, ei-
ther directly or through their nationals, including at least one State from the 
Eastern European (Socialist) region;  
(c) four members from among States Parties which on the basis of production 
in areas under their jurisdiction are major net exporters of the categories of 
minerals to be derived from the Area, including at least two developing States 
whose exports of such minerals have a substantial bearing upon their econo-
mies;  
(d) six members from among developing States Parties, representing special in-
terests. The special interests to be represented shall include those of States with 
large populations, States which are land-locked or geographically disadvan-
taged, States which are major importers of the categories of minerals to be de-
rived from the Area, States which are potential producers of such minerals, and 
least developed States; 
 (e) eighteen members elected according to the principle of ensuring an equita-
ble geographical distribution of seats in the Council as a whole, provided that 
each geographical region shall have at least one member elected under this 
subparagraph. For this purpose, the geographical regions shall be Africa, Asia, 
Eastern European (Socialist), Latin America and Western European and Others. 
UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 161, ¶ 1. 
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found in those provisions concerning marine scientific research and the 
preservation of the marine environment in the Area.45 Article 246, appli-
cable in the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf, in-
cludes marine scientific research projects carried out “in order to increase 
scientific knowledge of the marine environment for the benefit of all 
mankind” and “of direct significance for the exploration and exploitation of 
natural resources, whether living or non-living.”46 No provision of 
UNCLOS distinguishes between marine scientific research carried out for 
commercial purposes on the one hand, and research that does not have di-
rect commercial potential or is not suitable for commercial exploitation on 
the other.47 Indeed, bioprospecting—i.e., the research, collection, and 
utilization of biological and genetic resources with the aim of applying 
the knowledge derived for scientific and/or commercial purposes48—falls 
under the notion of “marine scientific research.”49 Therefore, any bio-
prospecting done in the Area must be performed in compliance with Article 
143, which provides: 
1. Marine scientific research in the Area shall be carried out exclusively 
for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of mankind as a whole, in ac-
cordance with Part XIII.  
. . . . 
3. States Parties may carry out marine scientific research in the Area. 
States Parties shall promote international cooperation in marine scien-
tific research in the Area by: 
(a) participating in international programmes and encouraging 
cooperation in marine scientific research by personnel of dif-
ferent countries and of the Authority; 
(b) ensuring that programmes are developed through the Au-
thority or other international organizations as appropriate for 
the benefit of developing States and technologically less de-
veloped States . . . ; 
                                                                                                             
 45. Id. arts. 143, 145. 
 46. Id. art. 246, ¶¶ 3, 5(a). 
 47. Tullio Scovazzi, The Seabed Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction: General 
and Institutional Aspects, in THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIME, supra note 43, at 58 
[hereinafter Scovazzi, Seabed Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction]. 
 48. KATE & LAIRD, supra note 11, at 19. 
 49. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 246. 
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(c) effectively disseminating the results of research and analy-
sis when available, through the Authority or other internation-
al channels when appropriate.50 
Even if MGRs in the Area cannot be considered part of the heritage of 
mankind regime,51 they reasonably fall under “common concerns” in the 
sense that they are resources in which the majority of states have an in-
terest because of their location—in areas beyond national jurisdiction, 
and so potentially exploitable by all states—and are also common be-
cause of their potential benefits to mankind.52 To consider MGRs as 
common concerns would root the creation of a legal regime, which 
would regulate MGRs and their exploitation in the view of protecting 
such common concerns for the benefit of mankind. 
However, as shown earlier, it is difficult to determine whether an MGR 
is located on the seabed or in the water column. Article 143 of UNCLOS 
on marine scientific research could be applicable to MGRs located in the 
Area and thus govern bioprospecting carried out in the Area, but not in 
the water column. Likewise, Article 135 of UNCLOS states that the legal 
status of the waters superjacent to the Area and of the air space above 
those waters should not be undermined by the regime created by Part 
XI.53 In the water column, beyond national jurisdiction, all states enjoy 
the freedom of scientific research guaranteed by Articles 87.1(f) and 
257.54 
                                                                                                             
 50. Id. art. 143. 
 51. As defined in Id. art. 136. 
 52. “[c]ertains domaines ne concernent pas les intérêts d’un Etat par rapport aux 
autres, mais touchent aux intérêts fondamentaux de la grande majorité des Etats, c’est-à-
dire – pour ceux qui croient qu’elle existe – aux intérêts de la communauté internatio-
nale.” Tullio Scovazzi, La notion de patrimoine culturel de l’humanité dans les instru-
ments internationaux [The Notion of Cultural Heritage of Mankind in International In-
struments], in LE PATRIMOINE CULTUREL DE L’HUMANITÉ 3 (James A. R. Nafziger & Tul-
lio Scovazzi eds., 2008) (Fr.). 
 53. Article 135 of UNCLOS on the legal status of the superjacent waters and air 
space states that “[n]either this Part nor any rights granted or exercised pursuant thereto 
shall affect the legal status of the waters superjacent to the Area or that of the air space 
above those waters.” UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 135. 
 54. Marine scientific research consists in a multitude of disciplines (biology, geogra-
phy, geology, physics etc.). UNCLOS specifically regulates marine scientific research in 
Part XIII. Id. arts. 235–65. Under UNCLOS, “[a]ll States, irrespective of their geograph-
ical location, and competent international organizations have the right to conduct marine 
scientific research subject to the rights and duties of other States as provided for in this 
Convention.” Id. This right is also guaranteed under Article 87 of UNCLOS, which sets 
forth the freedoms of the high seas, including the freedom of scientific research. Id. art. 
87; see ROBIN R. CHURCHILL & A. VAUGHAN LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 203 (3d ed. 
1999); Marko Pavliha  & Norman A. Martínez Gutiérrez, Marine Scientific Research and 
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Alternatively, Article 241 applies to both the Area as well as the water 
column and provides that “[m]arine scientific research activities shall not 
constitute the legal basis for any claim to any part of the marine envi-
ronment or its resources.”55 The collection of samples for the creation of 
biotechnologies could be considered as being in the interest of the 
“community.”56 Just like all the activities carried out in areas beyond na-
tional jurisdiction, it has to be conducted with regard to the international 
community’s interest. This notion is buttressed by UNCLOS’s preamble 
stating that: 
The States Parties to this Convention . . . will promote the peaceful uses 
of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their re-
sources, the conservation of their living resources, 
Desiring by this Convention to develop the principles embodied in res-
olution 2749 (XXV) of 17 December 1970 in which the General As-
sembly of the United Nations solemnly declared inter alia that the area 
of the seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction, as well as its resources, are the common herit-
age of mankind, the exploration and exploitation of which shall be car-
ried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the geo-
graphical location of States.57 
These paragraphs of the Preamble encourage interpreting relevant 
UNCLOS provisions to be applied to MGRs. Such sentiment takes inspi-
ration from the common heritage of mankind regime, as embodied in the 
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2749.58 However, for a truly com-
plete and uncontested application of Part XI to MGRs, the parties must 
agree to an amendment to the Convention. Unfortunately, such an event 
would require long negotiations given the disagreements, discussed later, 
that prevail with regard to the application of IPRs over biotechnologies. 
Before considering the feasibility of an amendment, the regime de-
scribed above must be examined and interpreted with regard to other rel-
                                                                                                             
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 
115 (2010); Alfred H. Soons, Regulation of Marine Scientific Research by the European 
Community and its Member States, in 23 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 259, 261 (1992); Alfred 
H. Soons, The Legal Regime of Marine Scientific Research: Current Issues, in LAW, 
SCIENCE AND OCEAN MANAGEMENT 139 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 2007). 
 55. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 241. 
 56. Francisco Orrego Vicuna, Les législations nationales pour l’exploitation des 
fonds marins et leur incompatibilité avec le droit international [National Laws allowing 
for the Exploitation of the Seabed and their Incompatibility with International Law], 24 
ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 810, 812 (1978) (Fr.). 
 57. UNCLOS, supra note 14, pmbl., ¶¶ 5–6. 
 58. See supra note 35. 
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evant instruments, as required by the general rule of interpretation of 
treaties set forth in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(“VCLT”).59 Moreover, UNCLOS is a product of its time. It should be 
applied in light of the normative evolutions that have occurred since it 
was adopted.60 As numerous states are simultaneously party to 
UNCLOS, TRIPS, and the CBD, these two latter treaties will be ana-
lyzed both separately and jointly. 
B. Finding Space for MGRs in TRIPS 
1. The Legal Framework of TRIPS 
TRIPS was concluded under the auspices of the WTO.61 WTO mem-
bers states (and parties to the Agreement) number 153 and approximately 
130 of them are also contracting parties of UNCLOS.62 Inventions ob-
tained from genetic resources, including MGRs, can be patented accord-
ing to Part II, Section V of TRIPS, which provides minimum standards 
of intellectual property protection.63 TRIPS establishes that “patents shall 
                                                                                                             
 59. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 
art. 31, ¶ 3(c) [hereinafter VCLT]. 
 60. See supra note 26. 
 61. TRIPS, supra note 16. 
 62. Understanding the WTO: Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 
2011). 
 63. On TRIPS, see Carlos M. Correa, Patents Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 227 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdul-
qawi A. Yusuf eds., 2d ed. 2008); CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (2007); 
DANIEL J. GERVAIS, L’ACCOR SUR LES ADPIC [THE TRIPS AGREEMENT] (2010) (Fr.); 
DANIEL J. GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (3d ed. 
2008); MITSUO MATSUSHITA, THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & PETROS C. MAVROIDIS, THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LAW, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 699 (2d ed. 2006). The grant 
of patents on biotech inventions has given rise to a strong debate between developed and 
developing WTO member countries. As we will explain below, it constitutes one of the 
main subjects discussed within the Doha Round. The regulation of biotechnologies in 
international law and the patentability of biotech inventions have also been examined in 
many scholarly writings. See also ENRICO BONADIO, SISTEMA BREVETTUALE TRIPS E 
RISORSE GENETICHE: ESIGENZE COMMERCIALI E INTERESSI PUBBLICI [THE TRIPS PATENT 
SYSTEM AND GENETIC RESOURCES: TRADE ISSUES AND PUBLIC INTEREST] (Jovene Editore 
S.P.A. 2008) (It.); BIOETICA E BIOTECNOLOGIE NEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE E 
COMUNITARIO: QUESTIONI GENERALI E TUTELA DELLA PROPRIETÀ INTELLETTUALE 
[BIOETHICS AND BIOTECHNOLOGIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL AND EC LAW: GENERAL AND 
IP ISSUES] (Nerina Boschiero ed., 2006) (It.) [hereinafter  BIOETICA E BIOTECNOLOGIE NEL 
DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE E COMUNITARIO]; JONATHAN CURCI, THE PROTECTION OF 
BIODIVERSITY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INTELLECTUAL 
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be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all 
fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive 
step and are capable of industrial application.”64 Therefore, patents can 
be granted on inventions based on MGRs if these three essential condi-
tions are simultaneously fulfilled. Moreover, as a necessary condition, 
applications shall contain invention descriptions sufficiently clear and 
complete for the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the 
art.65 According to Article 28 of TRIPS, a patent confers on its owner a 
series of exclusive rights, including the right to prevent third parties, not 
expressly authorized to the contrary, from making, using, offering for 
sale, selling, or importing the product or the process covered by patent. 
These protections shall not end before twenty years of the filing date.66 
Given the patentability of inventions derived from MGRs—such as 
pharmaceutical products or processes—which are novel, original, indus-
trial and properly described, the exceptions established by Article 27 of 
TRIPS acquire importance in this field. Firstly, Paragraph 2 provides that 
member states are allowed to exclude from patentability “inventions the 
commercial exploitation of which is necessary to protect ordre public or 
morality.”67 Ordre public and morality are composed of mandatory rules, 
the application of which cannot be neglected:68 ordre public refers to 
those basic values prevailing in society and is meant to include public 
                                                                                                             
PROPERTY 30 (2010); BIOTECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Francesco Francioni & 
Tullio Scovazzi eds., 2006); BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE (Charles R. McManis ed., 2007); 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES (Burton Ong ed., 2004); 
RICCARDO PAVONI, BIODIVERSITÀ E BIOTECNOLOGIE NEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE E 
COMUNITARIO [BIODIVERSITY AND BIOTECHNOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL AND EC LAW] 
(2004) (It.) [hereinafter PAVONI, BIODIVERSITÀ E BIOTECNOLOGIE]. The present study does 
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grant of patents on biotech inventions. On the contrary, it will be focused only on the 
examination of those aspects specifically concerning the grant of patents on MGRs, tak-
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 64. TRIPS, supra note 16, art. 27, ¶ 1. 
 65. Id. art. 29. 
 66. Id. art. 33. 
 67. Correa, Patents Rights, supra note 63, at 229. 
 68. According to Pierre-Marie Dupuy: “L’indérogeabilité est un attribut conféré à une 
norme en raison de son caractère d’ordre public, qu’aucune volonté individuelle ne sau-
rait transcender sans porter du même coup atteinte à la sécurité de l’ensemble du système 
et des intérêts collectifs de la société qu’il a à charge de réguler.” Pierre-Marie Dupuy,  
L’unité de l’ordre juridique international: Cours général de droit international public 
[The Unity of International Law: General Course on Public International Law], in 297 
RECUEIL DES COURS. COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 282 (2002) (Neth.). 
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safety, the physical integrity of individuals, and the protection of the en-
vironment; morality instead is based on ethical norms accepted and deep-
ly rooted in a particular culture.69 Secondly, pursuant to Paragraph 3(a), 
members may consider diagnostic, therapeutic, and surgical methods for 
the treatment of humans and animals as nonpatentable subject matter.70 
On the contrary, given the nature of MGRs and the techniques employed, 
biotech inventions from MGRs are not affected by Article 27.3(b), which 
provides for exceptions to patents on “plants and animals other than mi-
cro-organisms”—i.e. a category to which MGRs should not be as-
cribed—“and essentially biological processes for the production of plants 
or animals other than non-biological and microbiological processes”—
i.e. techniques different from biotechnologies.71 
As mentioned above, TRIPS, like other treaties, must be interpreted in 
the light of the general principles on treaty interpretation enshrined in the 
VCLT.72 This is important, as it pertains to the grant of patents on inven-
tions based on MGRs, considering that the dispute settlement system of 
the WTO “serves . . . to clarify the existing provisions of those agree-
ments in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public in-
ternational law”73 and the principles provided in Articles 31 and 32 of the 
VCLT74 have attained status of customary international law in the WTO 
Appellate Body’s reports.75 
Thus, according to Article 31.1 of the VCLT, TRIPS shall be “inter-
preted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given 
to its terms in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”76 
Reference should then be made to Article 7, which sets out objectives 
and establishes that the protection and enforcement of IPRs: “should con-
                                                                                                             
 69. See Angelica Bonfanti, Environmental Risk in Biotech Patent Disputes: Which 
Role for Ordre Public before the European Patent Office?, EUR. J. OF RISK REG. (forth-
coming); E. Richard Gold, The Ethics of Biotechnological Intellectual Property, in 
BIOTECHNOLOGY, IP & ETHICS 15 (E. Richard Gold & Bartha Maria Knoppers eds., 
2009); OLIVER MILLS, BIOTECHNOLOGICAL INVENTIONS: MORAL RESTRAINTS AND PATENT 
LAW (2010). 
 70. Correa, Patents Rights, supra note 63, at 231. 
 71. TRIPS, supra note 16, art. 27, ¶ 3(b); PAVONI, BIODIVERSITÀ E BIOTECNOLOGIE, 
supra note 63, at 110. 
 72. Isabelle Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body, 21 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 605, 620 (2010) 
 73. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, 
art. 3, ¶ 2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organiza-
tion, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. 
 74. VCLT, supra note 59, arts. 31–32. 
 75. Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conven-
tional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R, at 16–17 (Apr. 29, 1996). 
 76. VCLT, supra note 59, art. 31, ¶ 1; Van Damme, supra note 72, at 631. 
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tribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer 
and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers 
and users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to so-
cial and economic welfare.”77 
Moreover, pursuant to Article 31.2 of the VCLT,78 TRIPS shall be in-
terpreted in the context79 of the preambulary statements of the Agree-
ment establishing the WTO, “allowing for the optimal use of the world’s 
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, 
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the 
means for doing so in a manner consistent with . . . needs and concerns at 
different levels of economic development.”80 
Finally, as clarified by the Appellate Body, the WTO Agreements shall 
not be interpreted in “clinical isolation.”81 On the contrary, they should 
be read through the lens of subsequent practice,82 and of “any relevant 
                                                                                                             
 77. TRIPS, supra note 16, art. 7. 
 78. VCLT, supra note 59, art. 31, ¶ 2. 
 79. See generally MARK VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION 
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Griller ed., 2008); JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 25, 35 (2003); 
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pute Settlement, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL 
ANALYSIS 1405 (Patrick F. J. Macrory ed., 2005); see also Isabelle Van Damme, Treaty 
Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body, supra note 72; Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 
26, paras. 165, 345; Isabelle Van Damme, Some Observations about the ILC Study Group 
Report on the Fragmentation of International Law: WTO Treaty Interpretation against 
the Background of Other International Law, 17 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 21 (2006). 
 82. VCLT, supra note 59, art. 31, ¶ 3(b); Georg Nolte, Subsequent Practice as a 
Means of Interpretation in the Jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body, in THE LAW OF 
TREATIES BEYOND THE VIENNA CONVENTION 138, 140–41 (Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2011); 
VILLIGER, VIENNA CONVENTION COMMENTARY, supra note 79, at 431. 
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rules of international law applicable in the relations between the par-
ties.”83 Applying Article 31.3(c) of the VCLT to the WTO Agreements 
may require consideration of other international law provisions, either 
customary or conventional, which are both binding on the parties and 
simultaneously applicable to the issue at stake.84 When dealing with the 
grant of patents on inventions from MGRs, relevant provisions of inter-
national law can be found in UNCLOS and CDB, which, as noted before, 
contribute to framing the MGRs’ legal regime and provide for their legal 
status and management. Therefore, when applying TRIPS in this field 
and interpreting its rules, UNCLOS and CBD provisions could be con-
sidered rules of international law relevant to the grant of patents on in-
ventions derived from them. In light of the analysis undertaken on inter-
preting TRIPS, a discussion of its relationships to UNCLOS and the 
CBD can now follow. 
2. The Compatibility of IPRs and MGRs 
To some extent, the standards provided by TRIPS, and even the attrib-
ution of exclusive rights to private individuals through the grant of pa-
tents, may be considered incompatible with some provisions set out by 
UNCLOS. Indeed, as underscored by the Secretary General report on 
Oceans and Law of the Sea: 
[t]he following questions may arise and require further consideration: 
whether filing a patent application is considered as a claim to part of 
                                                                                                             
 83. VCLT, supra note 59, art. 31, ¶ 3(c); VILLIGER, VIENNA CONVENTION 
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the marine environment or its resources; whether the rights conferred 
by a patent are likely to interfere with the right to carry out marine sci-
entific research; and whether the degree of confidentiality required pri-
or to the filing for patents in order to safeguard the novel character of 
an invention is compatible with the requirement for dissemination and 
publication of data and research results.85 
Firstly, according to some of the essential principles on which it is 
based, the Area is a commons.86 As such, it is not subject to appropria-
tion by individual states or persons, natural, or juridical.87 Activities in 
the Area must be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole and 
proceeds must be equitably shared among all parties.88 As demonstrated 
above, even if MGRs are not directly encompassed in the common herit-
age regime regulated by Part XI of UNCLOS, they constitute common 
concerns submitted to common use. Therefore, granting patents or inven-
tions obtained from MGRs could be considered as incompatible with the 
nature of commons—it would provide the holder an exclusive right to 
use and commercially exploit the invention and, to some extent, also the 
natural resources on which it is based, without requiring that activities on 
MGRs are carried out for the benefit of mankind or that economic bene-
fits arising from them are equitably shared among all states.89 
Secondly, Article 241 of UNCLOS addresses the “non-recognition of 
marine scientific research activities as the legal basis for claims.”90 This 
article implies that scientific research and bioprospection on MGRs shall 
not constitute the legal basis for claims either of ownership or of exclu-
sive use of the resources. To correctly understand the meaning of Article 
241, consideration should be given to the preparatory works. These re-
veal that the Article was adopted to preclude research being used as the 
basis for claims of “exploitation rights or any other rights in areas be-
yond national jurisdiction.”91 As underlined by some, the grant of patents 
on inventions derived from MGRs, as far as they attribute to their holder 
the exclusive rights to use and commercially exploit the covered inven-
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 86. See supra p. 192–98. 
 87. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 137. Vladimir-Djuro Degan, The Common Heritage 
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tions, could be considered contrary to Article 241.92 Indeed, patents im-
ply a concurrent restriction of third parties’ rights to use and exploit 
MGRs located beyond national jurisdiction, which is exactly the effect 
that Article 241 attempts to prevent.93 
Finally, according to Article 244 of UNCLOS, states shall publicize 
and disseminate research results, knowledge, scientific data, and infor-
mation.94 The same is required of scientific research undertaken in the 
Area, articulated in Article 143, which states that scientific results, when 
available, shall be duly disseminated to state parties.95 Pursuant to Article 
246.3, marine scientific research shall be carried out “in order to increase 
scientific knowledge of the marine environment for the benefit of all 
mankind.”96 Moreover, according to these provisions, the dissemination 
of scientific results and knowledge shall favor developing countries, 
which shall be given the chance to increase their autonomous scientific 
and professional skill.97 In light of these objectives, the grant of patents 
on marine scientific research results could be seen, at least in the short 
term, as contrary to UNCLOS,98 unless the description of the invention, 
disclosing the coverage and best mode for carrying out the invention, can 
be considered as fulfilling UNCLOS provisions and guaranteeing the 
compliance of IPRs with UNCLOS requirements. 
C. Protecting Biological Diversity beyond National Jurisdiction 
1. The CBD Legal Framework 
The CBD was concluded in Rio de Janeiro on June 5, 1992, and en-
tered into force on December 29, 1993.99 It has currently been ratified by 
193 states. The CBD’s objectives consist of “the conservation of biologi-
cal diversity, the sustainable use of its components, and the fair and equi-
table sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic re-
sources, including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by ap-
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propriate transfer of relevant technologies.”100 Pursuant to the CBD, 
states have the sovereign right to exploit their own natural resources101 
and the authority to regulate foreign states public institutions, and private 
institutions’ access to them.102 
Two mandatory principles govern access to these genetic resources. 
First, the access to genetic resources is subject to the prior and informed 
consent of the national authority of the state on the territory or jurisdic-
tion the jurisdiction of which the resource is located.103 Second, the terms 
that authorize access are agreed upon between the provider state and the 
user.104 The content of the terms comprising the second principle is left 
to the discretion of the parties. Nonetheless, the terms should ensure that 
benefits arising from the economic exploitation of the resources are fairly 
and equitably shared between the user and the provider state.105 Due to 
the vagueness of the notion of “fair and equitable sharing of benefits,” 
which the CBD does not define precisely, and considering that neither a 
model contract nor standard clauses are provided by the convention, such 
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Diversity: Their Interrelation and Implementation Guidance for Access and Benefit Shar-
ing, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 243 (2006); Aphrodite Smagadi, The Impact of the Conven-
tion on Biological Diversity on the Utilization of Plant Genetic Resources and Benefit 
Sharing, 6 Y.B. EUR. ENVTL. L. 119 (2006); Zakir Thomas, Common Heritage to Com-
mon Concern. Preserving a Heritage and Sharing Knowledge, 8 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 
248 (2005). 
 101. CBD, supra note 15, art. 3. 
 102. Id. art. 15. 
 103. Id. art. 15, ¶ 5. 
 104. Id. art. 15, ¶ 4. 
 105. Id. art. 15, ¶ 7. 
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an objective cannot be easily reached. Indeed, practice demonstrates that 
the corresponding obligation is seldom fulfilled.106 
Given the practical difficulties faced by states and private operators 
with regard to sharing, in 2002 the Conference of the Parties to the CBD 
adopted the Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair 
and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of their Utilization (the 
“Bonn Guidelines”).107 This nonbinding instrument aims at facilitating 
access to genetic resources and ensuring that benefits of any commercial-
ization are duly shared with provider states.108 The Bonn Guidelines clar-
ify the means through which the prior and informed consent and the fair 
and equitable benefit sharing should be applied by national governments 
and suggest a legal formula according to which they should be concretely 
fulfilled. 
Additionally, the CBD framework was recently expanded with the 
adoption of the Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair 
and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization (“Na-
goya Protocol”).109 After lengthy negotiations,110 the Protocol was adopt-
                                                                                                             
 106. Nerina Boschiero, Le biotecnologie tra etica e principi generali del diritto inter-
nazionale [Biotechnologies between Ethics and General Principles of International Law], 
in BIOETICA E BIOTECNOLOGIE NEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE E COMUNITARIO, supra note 
63, at 70–71; Jonathan Carr, Agreements That Divide: TRIPs vs. CBD and Proposals for 
Mandatory Disclosure of Source and Origin of Genetic Resources in Patent Applications, 
18 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 131, 134 (2008); James S. Miller, Impact of the Convention 
on Biological Diversity: The Lessons of Ten Years of Experience with Models for Equita-
ble Sharing of Benefits, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
BIOTECHNOLOGY & TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 63, at 58, 65–66; Morin, supra 
note 100, at 307. 
 107. Sixth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, The Hague, Neth., Apr. 7–9, 2002, Decision VI/24/A: Annex: Bonn Guidelines 
on  Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising 
out of their Utilization, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20 [hereinafter Bonn Guidelines], 
available at http://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?id=7198; see generally W. Bradnee Cham-
bers, Emerging International Rules on the Commercialization of Genetic Resources: The 
FAO International Plant Genetic Treaty and the CBD Bonn Guidelines, 6 J. WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. 311 (2003); Jeffery supra note 100, at 747; Stephan Tully, The Bonn 
Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit Sharing, 12 REV. EUR. CMTY & 
INT’L ENVTL. L. 84, 84 (2003). 
 108. Chambers, supra note 107, at 314; Jeffery, supra note 100, at 747; Tully, supra 
note 107, at 84. 
 109. Tenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, Nagoya, Jap., Oct. 29, 2010, Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources 
and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the Con-
vention on Biological Diversity, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/1 [hereinafter Na-
goya Protocol], available at http://www.cbd.int/abs/text/. 
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ed on October 29, 2010, by the Conference of the parties of the CBD. It 
will remain open for signature until February 1, 2012, and it will enter 
into force after the fiftieth instrument of ratification is deposited.111 
2. Do MGRs Fall Under the CBD? 
Some maintain that the CBD cannot directly apply to MGRs, neither in 
the water column nor in the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction, 
because of the CBD’s limited territorial scope112 and the bilateral nature 
of the exploitation scheme.113 To the contrary, MGRs can fall within the 
reach of the CBD. However, given that the drafters of UNCLOS kept in 
mind the possibility of future normative developments,114 the CBD must 
firstly be interpreted consistently with UNCLOS when it comes to ma-
rine biodiversity before any application to MGRs can be made. 
UNCLOS provides an important set of rules for the protection of the 
marine environment in Part XII.115 These provisions do not apply exclu-
sively in the sense that Part XII is a sort of “umbrella” agreement for the 
protection of marine environment.116 This role of UNCLOS Part XII is 
performed by the integration mechanism set out in Article 237, which 
provides: 
                                                                                                             
 110. Negotiations were conducted by the Ad Hoc Open Ended Working Group on 
Access and Benefit-Sharing of the CBD (“ABS Working Group”). Background, 
CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://www.cbd.int/abs/background (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2011). The ABS Working Group was originally given in 2004 the task of drafting 
a new legal instrument, called the International Regime on Access to Genetic Resources 
and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising from Their Use. Id. The nego-
tiations for such an instrument lead to the drafting of the Protocol. Id. For information 
concerning activities carried out by the ABS Working Group, see CONVENTION ON 
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://www.cbd.int/abs/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2011). 
 111. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 109, arts. 26–27. 
 112. CBD, supra note 15, art. 4. 
 113. Nele Matz-Lück, The Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind: Its Viability 
as a Management Tool for Deep-Sea Genetic Resources, in THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
REGIME, supra note 43, at 63. 
 114. Article 237 in fact requires that subsequent instruments be uniformly applied with 
UNCLOS. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 237. 
 115. Id. arts. 192–237. 
 116. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY, 
supra note 91, at 423. See also Tullio Treves, Réflexions sur quelques conséquences de 
l’entrée en vigueur de la Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer [Reflections 
on a Number of Consequences of the Entry into Force of the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea], 1994 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 849, 853–54 
(Fr.), in which the author affirms: “Cet article [l’art. 237] vise à permettre à la Partie XII 
de la Convention de mieux fonctionner comme convention-cadre vis-à-vis des autres 
conventions qui portent sur la protection de l’environnement.” 
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1. The provisions of this Part are without prejudice to the specific obli-
gations assumed by States under special conventions and agreements 
concluded previously which relate to the protection and preservation of 
the marine environment and to agreements which may be concluded in 
furtherance of the general principles set forth in this Convention. 
2. Specific obligations assumed by States under special conventions, 
with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environ-
ment, should be carried out in a manner consistent with the general 
principles and objectives of this Convention.117 
This provision highlights how UNCLOS has an interdependent rela-
tionship with the existing instruments in the field of marine environ-
ment.118 This must be kept in mind when turning to the relevant provi-
sions of the CBD, namely Article 4, which provides: 
Subject to the rights of other States, and except as otherwise expressly 
provided in this Convention, the provisions of this Convention apply, in 
relation to each Contracting Party: 
(a) In the case of components of biological diversity, in areas 
within the limits of its national jurisdiction; and 
(b) In the case of processes and activities, regardless of where 
their effects occur, carried out under its jurisdiction or control, 
within the area of its national jurisdiction or beyond the limits 
of national jurisdiction.119 
Some believe that Article 4(b) of the CBD precludes direct application 
to MGRs in the water column of the high seas or on the deep seabed,120 
while others authors suggest that “the State parties may only regulate the 
activities of their own nationals to achieve the objectives of the CBD. So 
far no state has implemented measures specifically regulating activities 
of their nationals.”121 The latter view is contestable in the light of exist-
ing regulations, both national and international, concerning activities car-
ried out on the high seas. For example, the freedom of high seas, a rule 
beloved by states and approaching dogma, does not mean that states can 
                                                                                                             
 117. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 237 (emphasis added). 
 118. Seline Trevisanut, La Convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer et le 
droit de l’environnement: développement intrasystémique et renvoi intersystémique [The 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and Environnemental Law: Intrasys-
temic Development and Intersystemic Cross-Reference], in LA CIRCULATION DES 
CONCEPTS JURIDIQUES, supra note 23, at 415 (Fr.). 
 119. CBD, supra note 15, art. 4 (emphasis added). 
 120. Matz-Lück, supra note 113, at 63. 
 121. LEARY, INTERNATIONAL LAW & DEEP SEA GENETIC RESOURCES, supra note 39, at 
52. 
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do anything they want. Rather, the freedom of high seas is well regulated 
both by customary and treaty law.122 This freedom encompasses, inter 
alia, the freedom of navigation, the freedom to construct artificial islands 
and installations, and the freedom of scientific research,123 which “shall 
be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States 
in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard 
for the rights under this Convention with respect to activities in the Ar-
ea.”124 
The fundamental condition for enjoying these freedoms is the national-
ity of vessels. States enjoy freedoms that their nationals can likewise en-
joy.125 Thus any vessel exercising an activity in the high seas has to be 
linked with a state, exhibited by the flying of the flag.126 Such vessels are 
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag state,127 which has to ex-
ercise “its jurisdiction and control” over it.128 Unfortunately, not all flag 
states are willing to exercise effectively their control on vessels.129 Con-
sequently the implementation of the above mentioned CBD principles is 
hampered. 
However, it may then be asked whether other states might act under 
Article 4(b) CBD. Processes or activities concerning MGRs can presum-
ably be carried out or funded by a private actor, a research institute, or a 
pharmaceutical company, which controls the activity or process. Private 
actors have a nationality in conformity with international law criteria.130 
                                                                                                             
 122. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 87, ¶ 1(f); CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 54, at 
203. 
 123. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 87, ¶ 1(a), (d), (f). 
 124. Id. art. 87, ¶ 2. 
 125. Id. arts. 90–91; CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 54, at 166. 
 126. UNCLOS, supra note 14, arts. 91–92. 
 127. Id. art. 92, ¶ 1. 
 128. Id. art. 94. 
 129. See Dr. Ademuni-Odeke, An Examination of Bareboat Charter Registries and 
Flag of Convenience Registries in International Law, 36 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 339, 341 
(2005); JOHN N. K. MANSELL, FLAG STATE RESPONSIBILITY: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES, AN ANALYSIS OF FLAG STATE RESPONSIBILITY FROM A 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 140–41 (2009); Djamchid Momtaz, La Convention des Nations 
Unies sur les conditions d’immatriculation des navires [The United Nations Convention 
on Conditions for Registration of Ships], 1986 ANNUAIRE FRANÇAIS DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL 715 (Fr.); Tullio Treves, Flags of Convenience before the Law of the Sea 
Tribunal, 6 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 179 (2004). 
 130. As far as the nationality of legal persons is concerned, the main international law 
criteria were stated by the International Court of Justice in the Barcelona Traction, Light 
and Power Company, Limited (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep 3 (Feb. 5). 
Comments on this case can be found in Rosalyn Higgins, Aspects of the Case Concerning 
the Barcelona Traction Company, 11 VA. J. INT’L L. 327 (1971); Richard B. Lillich, Two 
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States are bound to exercise due diligence131 towards private actors and 
activities carried out on their territory or under their jurisdiction.132 It is 
debatable whether such an obligation exists with regard to private actors’ 
behavior outside the national state, i.e. if their activities abroad fall under 
the national state’s jurisdiction.133 However, even if the existence of such 
a general obligation is doubted, states must pay due diligence in specific 
sectors. For instance, UNCLOS provides that states “shall keep under 
surveillance the effects of any activities which they permit or in which 
they engage in order to determine whether these activities are likely to 
pollute the marine environment.”134 Reading Article 4(b) CBD in combi-
nation with this provision suggests that the state of nationality of private 
actors or even the state sponsoring the private activity does have a role to 
                                                                                                             
Perspectives on the Barcelona Traction Case, 65 AM. J. INT’L L. 522 (1971); Francis A. 
Mann, The Protection of Shareholders’ Interests in the Light of the Barcelona Traction 
Case, 67 AM. J. INT’L L. 259 (1973); Brigitte Stern, La protection diplomatique des inves-
tissements internationaux. De Barcelona Traction à Elettronica Sicula ou les glissements 
progressifs de l’analyse [The Diplomatic Protection of International Investments. From 
the Barcelona Traction to Elettronica Sicula and the Progressive Shifts in Analysis], 117 
JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 897 (1990) (Fr.). On the attribution of nationality to 
legal persons, see also Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 61st Sess., May 1–June 9, July 3–
Aug. 11, 2006, U.N. Doc. A/61/10, Supp. No. 10, at 13 (2006). 
 131. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Judgment, 
1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24). 
 132. RICCARDO PISILLO MAZZESCHI, “DUE DILIGENCE” E RESPONSABILITÀ 
INTERNAZIONALE DEGLI STATI [“DUE DILIGENCE” AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF 
THE STATES], 234–36 (1989) (It.). On this issue see U.S. v. Iran, 1980 I.C.J. at 3; Luigi 
Condorelli, L’imputation à l’Etat d’un fait internationalement illicite: solutions 
classiques et nouvelles tendances [The Attribution of Internationally Wrongful Acts to 
States: Classical Solutions and New Trends], 189 RECUEIL DES COURS. COLLECTED 
COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 19, 95 (1984) (Neth.). 
 133. The extraterritorial application of the due diligence obligation is an on-going and 
everlasting debate in international law literature and international legal practice. The 
analysis of such a topic goes far beyond the scope of the present contribution. See gener-
ally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 308 (7th ed. 2008); A. 
Vaughn Lowe, Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 341–42 (Malcolm D. Evands ed., 2d 
ed. 2008); Francis A. Mann, The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited after 
Twenty Years, 186 RECUEIL DES COURS. COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (1984) (Neth.); EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE (Karl Matthias Meessen ed., 1996); François Rigaux, Le concept de territorial-
ité: un fantasme en quête de réalité [The Concept of Territoriality: A Fantasy in Search 
of Reality], in LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI 211 (Emile Yapok & 
Tahar Boumedra eds., 1999) (Fr.); Brigitte Stern, Quelques observations sur les règles 
internationales relatives a l’application extraterritoriale du droit [Some Observations on 
International Rules Concerning the Extraterritorial Application of Law], 32 ANNUAIRE 
FRANC ̧AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 7 (1986). 
 134. UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 204 (emphasis added). 
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play;135 the state, if is a party to the CBD, would be bound by it in re-
gards to activities and processes concerning MGRs beyond national ju-
risdiction. 
This interpretation would be in line with the recommendation of the 
Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice of 
the CBD (“SBSTTA”):136 
(c) Concerned about the threats to genetic resources in the 
deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction, requests Parties and 
urges other States, having identified activities and processes 
under their jurisdiction and control which may have signifi-
cant adverse impacts on deep seabed ecosystems and species 
in these areas, as requested in paragraph 56 of decision VII/5, 
to take measures to urgently manage such practices in vulner-
                                                                                                             
 135. Under the regime set in Part XI, a state can sponsor the application of a private 
actor carrying out activities of exploration and exploitation of the Area. UNCLOS, supra 
note 14, art. 153. Considering the possible application of the Area regime concerning the 
exploitation of MGRs, the sponsoring by a state system can be taken into consideration 
for the MGRs regime. A potential sponsoring state could be encompassed in the scope of 
application of Article 4(b) CBD. UNCLOS does not precisely define the degree of con-
trol exercised by the sponsoring state on the private actor and on the activities. The dele-
gation of Nauru submitted such a proposal to the Council of the Authority, which then 
submitted a request for advisory opinion to the Seabed Disputes Chamber of ITLOS. 
Delegation of Nauru,  Proposal presented to the Int’l Seabed Auth. Council, 16th Sess., 
Apr. 26–May 7, 2010, ISBA/16/C/6 (Mar. 5 2010); Responsibilities and Obligations of 
States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area, ¶ 78, Case 
No. 17, Seabed Disputes Chamber Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, 
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_17/adv_op_010211.pdf, 
stating that:  
[a]s the Convention [UNCLOS] does not consider the links of nationality and 
effective control sufficient to obtain the result that the contractor conforms with 
the Convention and related instruments, it requires a specific act emanating 
from the will of the State or States of nationality and of effective control. Such 
act consists in the decision to sponsor. 
From this voluntary act follows an obligation of due diligence for the sponsoring state 
concerning the activities carried out by the sponsored private actors. Id. ¶ 116. Sponsor-
ship might be considered as a confirmation of the existence of effective control and, con-
sequently, confirm the application of Article 4(b) of the CBD. 
 136. Article 25 of the CBD establishes an open-ended intergovernmental scientific 
advisory body known as the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological 
Advice (“SBSTTA”) to provide the Conference of the Parties (“COP”) and its other sub-
sidiary bodies, with timely advice relating to the implementation of the Convention. 
CBD, supra note 15, art. 25. Its functions include providing assessments of the status of 
biological diversity, providing assessments of the types of measures taken in accordance 
with the provisions of the Convention, and responding to questions that the COP may put 
to the body. Id. 
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able deep seabed ecosystems with a view to the conservation 
and sustainable use of resources, and report on measures taken 
as part of the national reporting process.137 
This statement was echoed by Decision VIII/21 of the eighth CBD 
Conference of the parties, stressing the potential application of the CBD 
to the issue at hand and the active role parties of the CBD are called to 
play in the shaping of a regime for MGRs.138 Moreover, the recently 
adopted Nagoya Protocol139 recognizes the need of finding an “innova-
tive solution,” addressing “the fair and equitable sharing of benefits de-
rived from the utilization of genetic resources . . . for which it is not pos-
sible to grant or obtain prior informed consent.”140 This carefully worded 
expression seems to target genetic resources, such as MGRs, that do not 
fall under the jurisdiction of any state. This phrasing thus supports the 
view that the CBD applies to MGRs in areas beyond national jurisdic-
tion. 
II. A LEGAL REGIME FOR MGRS: FEASIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Despite the possibility that extra-territorial activities involving MGRs 
may still be attributable to a specific state, it remains to be determined 
who would be responsible for overseeing the administration of the legal 
regime. Indeed, it is evident that a “national state” cannot be identified 
when dealing with MGRs in areas beyond national jurisdiction. 
Generally, from developed nations’ perspectives, intellectual property 
is an essential incentive to invent and produce biotech products,141 the 
usefulness of which cannot be denied. As far as the G77 countries are 
concerned, the grant of patents for MGRs-based inventions gives rise to 
economic benefits that need to be equitably shared among the patent 
holder and the international community, with special consideration for 
the needs of developing countries.142 
                                                                                                             
 137. Eleventh Meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technological & Techno-
logical Advice [SBSTTA], Montreal, Can., Nov. 28–Dec. 2, 2005, Recommendation 
XI/8: Marine and coastal biological diversity: conservation and sustainable use of deep 
seabed genetic resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, ¶ 4(c) (2005), availa-
ble at http://www.cbd.int/recommendation/sbstta/?id=10967. 
 138. Eighth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, Curitiba, Braz., Mar. 20–31, 2006, Decision VIII/21: Marine and coastal bio-
logical diversity: conservation and sustainable use of deep seabed genetic resources 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, ¶ 3 (2006). 
 139. See supra note 109. 
 140. Nagoya Protocol, supra note 109, pmbl. 
 141. LEARY, INTERNATIONAL LAW & DEEP SEA GENETIC RESOURCES, supra note 39, at 
175. 
 142. Id. 
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Given the present unbalanced condition in the current legal regimes, it 
has been correctly noted that “it is hard to see how the majority of the 
international community will benefit from the monopoly protection pro-
vided to patent holders of biotechnology products derived from MGRs 
taken from ocean areas beyond national jurisdiction.”143 Considering this 
inequity in light of the undeniable contribution intellectual property pro-
tection provides to scientific and technological development, “states 
should seriously discuss viable and realistic options for . . . sharing bene-
fits in a fair and equitable way.”144 
In this light, this section (A) examines the means through which the in-
ternational obligations can be met when MGRs are concerned and (B) 
identifies which would be the most appropriate authority as a counterpar-
ty of the users. Four legal solutions are identified in the first section (A): 
(1) the application of the Bonn Guidelines; (2) the hopeful entry into 
force of the Nagoya Protocol to the CBD; (3) the adoption of a disclosure 
of origin clause to be inserted in TRIPS; and (4) the adoption of a legal 
model inspired to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 
(“FAO”) International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
                                                                                                             
 143. Robert J. McLaughlin, Exploiting Marine Genetic Resources beyond National 
Jurisdiction and the International Protection of Intellectual Property Rights: Can They 
Coexist?, in LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE, supra note 13, at 379. 
 144. Third Meeting of the U.N. Ad Hoc Open-Ended Informal Working Group to 
Study Issues Relating to the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Di-
versity beyond Areas of National Jurisdiction, New York, U.S., Feb. 1–5, 2010, EU In-
tervention on Agenda Item 5.g – Marine Genetic Resources, with a Particular Focus on 
the Relevant Regime in accordance with the Convention, at 2 (on file with the authors) 
[hereinafter U.N. Working Group, EU Intervention on Agenda Item 5.g]. According to 
Tullio Scovazzi, 
[w]hile a specific regime for the exploitation of genetic resources is lacking, the 
aim of sharing the benefit among all States, which was the main aspect of the 
seminal proposal made by Arvid Pardo, can still be seen as the paramount ob-
jective embodied in the LOS Convention for everything that takes place in the 
Area. Also in the field of genetic resources, the application of the principle of 
freedom of the sea (that is the ‘first-come-first-served’ rule) leads to inequitable 
and hardly acceptable consequences. New cooperative schemes have to be en-
visaged at the international level, based on the objective of the benefit of all 
States. This is also in full conformity with the principle of fair and equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources set 
forth by Article 1 of the CBD. 
Scovazzi, Seabed beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, supra note 47, at 57. See 
also Salvatore Arico, Marine Genetic Resources in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction 
and Intellectual Property Rights, in LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE, supra note 13, at 
385. 
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Agriculture.145 Section (B) explores two institutional scenarios: (1) the 
attribution of a primary role to the Authority and (2) the creation of a 
new international institution. 
A. Possible Legal Frameworks 
1. MGRs and the Bonn Guidelines 
The first solution to be explored considers the provisions of the Bonn 
Guidelines in guaranteeing both the protection of intellectual property 
and the fair and equitable benefit sharing for patented products based on 
MGRs. 
The Bonn Guidelines provide clarifications that facilitate the concrete 
application of CBD and, in particular, the enforcement of both the prior 
and informed consent and the fair and equitable benefit-sharing obliga-
tions.146 In order to pursue these objectives, the Bonn Guidelines estab-
lish that contracting parties shall set up National Focal Points, i.e., do-
mestic authorities focused on the management of the access procedure to 
genetic resources by foreign institutions, which also aim to enter into the 
agreements addressed to define the terms of such an access.147 Pursuant 
to the Guidelines, these terms should be agreed to on a case-by-case ba-
sis.148 Mechanisms for benefit sharing should vary depending upon the 
type of benefits, the specificity of the resource at issue, the specific con-
ditions in the country, and the stakeholders involved.149 The National 
Focal Points should also develop framework agreements, as well as 
standardize material transfer agreements and benefit-sharing arrange-
ments.150 Pursuant to Paragraph 48, benefits should be fairly and equita-
bly shared with all identifiable contributors to the resource management 
and to its scientific and commercial exploitation151 The latter “may in-
clude governmental, nongovernmental or academic institutions, as well 
as indigenous and local communities.”152 Moreover, “[b]enefits should 
be directed in such a way as to promote conservation and sustainable use 
                                                                                                             
 145. International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Nov. 
3, 2001, 2400 U.N.T.S. 303 [hereinafter ITPGRFA]. 
 146. Chambers, supra note 107, at 316; Jeffery, supra note 100, at 747; Thomas, supra 
note 100, at 250; Tully, supra note 107, at 84. 
 147. Bonn Guidelines, supra note 107, ¶ 13. 
 148. Id. ¶ 41. 
 149. Id. ¶ 42. 
 150. Id. ¶ 42(b)(iii)–(iv). 
 151. Id. ¶ 48. 
 152. Id. 
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of biological diversity.”153 Likewise, pursuant to Paragraph 43(a), ethical 
concerns of parties and stakeholders should be taken into consideration 
in drafting the mutually agreed-on terms.154 Parties and stakeholders 
should define the conditions, obligations, procedures, types, timing, dis-
tribution, and mechanisms upon which benefits should be shared.155 The-
se will vary depending on what is regarded as fair and equitable in light 
of the circumstances. Near-term, medium-term, and long-term benefits 
should be considered and monetary and nonmonetary benefits may be 
agreed upon.156 Some of the means suggested by the Bonn Guidelines are 
suitable with MGRs and should be applied in order to guarantee the fair 
and equitable sharing of the benefits accrued from their exploitation. 
Among these means are the attribution of payments; the setting up of 
joint ventures; the constitution of joint ownership on relevant IPRs; the 
sharing of research and development results; the transfer of relevant 
knowledge and technology; and the collaboration, cooperation and con-
tribution in scientific research and development programs.157 Finally, 
notable among Bonn’s suggested means is the payment of royalties, 158 
which could be considered to be in line with the system provided for by 
Article 82 of UNCLOS. 
This latter provision sets in place a mechanism for an international 
royalty to be levied for the exploitation of nonliving resources of the con-
tinental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles.159 Article 82 UNCLOS provides 
that coastal states shall make payments or contributions in respect of 
their exploitation and establishes the rate and the formula according to 
which the amount shall be calculated.160 Moreover, it provides that pay-
                                                                                                             
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. ¶ 43(a). 
 155. Id. ¶ 45. 
 156. Among the suggested examples listed in Appendix II for monetary benefits are 
up-front payments, milestone payments, payment of royalties, license fees, special fees to 
be paid to trust funds supporting conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, salaries 
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ments shall be made through the Authority, which shall distribute them 
to parties, on the basis of equitable sharing criteria and with special re-
gard to the needs of developing states, least developed states, and land-
locked countries.161 
As to the application of such a mechanism, it has been noted that “this 
revenue-sharing formula was developed with the unique characteristics 
of offshore oil and gas production in mind, but there is no reason why an 
appropriate formula could not also be found for revenues from commer-
cialization of MGRs,” which at that time were not yet discovered.162 In 
our view, the definition of formulas and rates according to which benefits 
should be shared represents an interesting and useful compromise be-
tween intellectual property protection and equity needs claimed by de-
veloping countries. Unfortunately, when applied to MGRs, such a meth-
od ineluctably faces difficulties due to the lack of an authority competent 
to manage their utilization, to authorize and discipline their exploitation 
and, consequently, to receive the amount of money deriving from the 
sharing of the economic benefits accrued. Should an institution gain such 
competences in the future, this solution could be taken into considera-
tion. 
2. MGRs and the Nagoya Protocol 
The possible approaches outlined in the Bonn Guidelines could be fur-
ther strengthened by the Nagoya Protocol’s entry into force. The Proto-
col defines the modalities according to which the parties shall enforce the 
principles of prior and informed consent and the fair and equitable bene-
fit-sharing obligations, as set out in the CBD. The content of many of its 
articles is either directly inspired or influenced by the Bonn Guidelines. 
As far as MGRs are specifically concerned, after long debates, the ne-
gotiating parties agreed to introduce a provision—Article 10—dealing 
expressly with sharing of benefits that arise from the utilization of genet-
ic resources in transboundary situations or from uses for which it is not 
possible to grant or obtain prior informed consent.163 Therefore, notwith-
standing the fact that many parties opposed the inclusion of MGRs in the 
application of the Protocol, it eventually applies also to their exploita-
tion.164 
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The relationship between the Protocol and other international instru-
ments is one of the most controversial points that arose during the nego-
tiations.165 The parties agreed on the final draft of Article 4, which has a 
complex structure that breaks into four paragraphs. The first paragraph is 
directly inspired by the coordination clause provided in Article 22 of the 
CBD and establishes that the present instrument “shall not affect the 
rights and obligations of any party deriving from any existing interna-
tional agreement, except where the exercise of those rights and obliga-
tions would cause a serious damage or threat to biological diversity.”166 
Further paragraphs provide for the Nagoya Protocol’s implementation in 
a “mutually supportive manner” with other relevant international instru-
ments and, in particular, with those specialized on access and benefit 
sharing.167 In this regard they follow the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafe-
ty168—the first Protocol to the CBD—in demanding mutual support as a 
tool of interpretation.169 However, the Nagoya Protocol differs by giving 
the provision on mutual support a broader ambit and an expressly bind-
ing character, as it is not limited to a general and preambulary statement. 
Moreover, according to Paragraph 3, “useful and relevant ongoing work 
or practices under international instruments and relevant organizations” 
deserve due regard in implementing the Protocol.170 The only situation in 
which the Nagoya Protocol is explicitly subjected to the application of 
other international instruments is set forth in Paragraph 4; namely, the 
Protocol shall not apply to states which are at the same time parties to 
another international instrument providing for the access and benefit-
sharing regime of a specific genetic resource, when this latter instrument 
is consistent with the letter and purpose of the CBD and the Nagoya Pro-
tocol.171 Therefore, the formulation of Article 4 gives the parties discre-
tion as to how they wish to deal with the management of MGRs, either 
through the application of already existing and consistent legal instru-
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ments, or by way of the future adoption of a specific and consistent 
one.172 
The Nagoya Protocol goes further than the Bonn Guidelines in estab-
lishing the issuance of internationally recognized certificates by the 
competent national authorities.173 It also provides for their notification to 
the Access and Benefit-Sharing Clearing House, a mechanism estab-
lished by the Protocol as part of the Clearing House mechanism set out in 
Article 18.3 CBD.174 Such certificates shall show that the genetic re-
source has been obtained, accessed, and used in accordance with prior 
informed consent, and that mutually agreed-upon terms have been en-
tered into.175 The certificates shall contain minimum information, such as 
the identities of the issuing national authority, the provider, and the user. 
Moreover, they shall specify the subject matter covered and the geo-
graphic location of the access activity, the uses permitted and the corre-
spondent restrictions, as well as the conditions of transfer to third par-
ties.176 Lastly, the certificates shall contain a link to the mutually agreed-
on terms regulating the benefit sharing.177 
The Protocol provides that parties shall establish clear rules and proce-
dures for mutually agreed-on terms.178 Such terms, to be set out in writ-
ing, may include a dispute settlement clause and terms on monetary and 
nonmonetary benefit sharing, as well as on subsequent third-party use. 
Monetary and nonmonetary benefits are listed in the Annex and are di-
rectly inspired by the Bonn Guidelines.179 Accordingly, parties shall en-
courage the development, update, and use of model contractual clauses 
for mutually agreed-upon terms, as well as the draft of codes of conduct 
and best practice standards in relation to access and benefit sharing, in 
consultation with users and providers from key sectors.180 The Protocol 
likewise provides that parties shall take measures to monitor the utiliza-
tion of genetic resources, for instance, by establishing checkpoints and 
disclosure requirements.181 
The Nagoya Protocol addresses the specific cases in which access and 
benefit sharing of genetic resources occur in transboundary situations or 
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in situations in which it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed 
consent. This is done through the Protocol’s provision that establishes a 
Global Multilateral Benefit-Sharing Mechanism.182 The parties agree to 
further develop its functional modalities according to their needs.183 Ad-
ditionally, with regard to benefits, the Protocol states that benefits arising 
from the utilization of resources shall be used to support the conservation 
of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its components global-
ly.184 
Thus the Nagoya Protocol appears to represent a workable solution for 
the management of MGRs. Indeed, the Protocol pursues the same legal 
objectives as the Bonn Guidelines—the fulfillment of the prior and in-
formed consent and of the fair and equitable benefit-sharing obliga-
tions—but may prove to be more effective. The Protocol is binding and 
provides for some solutions that are particularly suitable for MGRs, such 
as the creation of a Global Multilateral Benefit-Sharing Mechanism and 
the issuance of internationally recognized certificates.185 Should the for-
mer be effectively implemented, it could guarantee the conservation of 
biological diversity and the equitable sharing of benefits, while overcom-
ing some of the specific difficulties of MGRs’ management. Finally, 
should a specific international body ultimately enjoy the competence to 
authorize access to and commercial exploitation of MGRs, the issuance 
of international recognized certificates would certainly contribute to 
guaranteeing their correct administration and to avoiding abuses. 
3. MGRs and the Possibility of a “Disclosure of Origin” Clause 
According to the Doha Ministerial Declaration, the TRIPS Council is 
called upon to “examine, inter alia, the relationship between the TRIPS 
Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity,” as well as to 
review TRIPS relevant provisions.186 Negotiations are still underway 
since the topic gives rise to strong debates between developed and devel-
oping countries.187 Up to now, the main outcome of such negotiations is a 
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proposition to insert a “disclosure of origin clause” within TRIPS. Such a 
provision should have the effect of ensuring the respect of the CBD’s 
obligations at the moment of filing a patent application on inventions 
based on genetic resources detained by provider countries.188 However, 
as we will see below, negotiations are still ongoing and show a certain 
unpredictability with regard to the formulation and the actual insertion of 
the clause.189 
Starting with the beginning of the Doha Round in 2001 up to the 2011 
consultations, some member states, such as the United States and Japan, 
have maintained that no conflict exists between CBD and TRIPS, imply-
ing that the contractual approach provided in the CBD is a means to its 
own end.190 Others, in particular developing countries, pushed in favor of 
amending TRIPS, in order to insert a disclosure of origin clause.191 As 
we will see, some other WTO member countries have since significantly 
modified their positions.192 Among them, the European Union, who orig-
inally claimed that the topics should be dealt with outside the ambit of 
patent law (i.e. in civil or administrative law),193 and Switzerland, who 
supported the insertion of a disclosure of origin clause in the Patent Co-
operation Treaty,194 out of the WTO forum.195 
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After long debates, in July 2008, a group of fifty-two member states, 
composed mostly of developing countries, such as the African, Carribean 
and Pacific Group (“ACP Group”), India, Brazil, Peru, as well as China, 
South Africa, and the African Group, joined together with Switzerland 
and the European Union to agree on a common “Draft Modalities Text” 
(“DMT”).196 The sponsoring states proposed to amend TRIPS through 
the insertion in the text of a mandatory disclosure of origin require-
ment.197 According to the DMT, in order to comply with the latter re-
quirement, either the provider country or the source of the genetic re-
sources shall be disclosed in patent applications.198 
The insertion of the fourth mandatory requirement for patentability 
(additional to novelty, inventive step, and industrial application) into 
TRIPS would guarantee that patents would be released only for inven-
tions complying with the principles set by the CBD. Therefore, DMT 
would represent a very desirable compromise between developing coun-
tries and some developed states,199 and it would avoid burdensome oppo-
sition and revocation procedures being eventually perceived as the only 
means for obtaining, even if ex post, that patents comply with the essen-
tial requirements and the fundamental values guaranteed under the ordre 
public exception.200 
However, due to the vagueness of DMT, the following consultations 
“have not created convergence [but] have certainly shed light on the di-
vergences.”201 Member states have been debating four main points con-
cerning not only the legal character of misappropriation, administrative 
costs, and burdens connected with the introduction of the disclosure of 
origin clause, but also the adequacy of alternative measures. Additional-
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ly, debates include the legal character and enforcement possibilities of a 
national based approach.202 Each of the debated points is crucial for pa-
tents on MGRs. Indeed, a provision with a narrow definition of “misap-
propriation” (e.g., taking into account only illegal or illegitimate acts on 
those genetic resources which are located under the national jurisdiction 
of states) would clearly render the disclosure of origin clause unsuitable 
for MGRs. Moreover, the additional administrative costs deriving from 
incorporating the mandatory disclosure requirement might be excessively 
detrimental for investment and research development. This would clearly 
discourage states from insisting on its insertion as a requirement for pa-
tentability. Finally, should alternative solutions (such as national-based 
mechanisms or contract-based measures) be considered as more effective 
and less costly, the possibility of inserting a disclosure of origin clause 
would probably be put aside. 
The debate has not yet been settled and the situation has not yet con-
cretely evolved after the adoption of the Nagoya Protocol.203 The Doha 
Round is still open and new consultations have begun. Even if the out-
come can hardly be predicted, it is uncertain that a definite, precise, and 
adequate compromise on a disclosure of origin clause can be reached, 
one that would be capable of guaranteeing the enforcement of the prior 
and informed consent as well as the fair and equitable sharing of bene-
fits. However, in the unlikely event that such an outcome is reached, it 
could be very useful for the management of MGRs. Indeed, it would en-
sure the enforcement of the CBD’s obligations when patent applications 
on MGRs are filed by requiring mutually agreed-on terms on access and 
fair and equitable benefit-sharing. Nonetheless, it appears clear that in 
order for a disclosure of origin clause to be implemented and function 
properly, a centralized institution on the international level would have to 
be implemented and have the ability to enforce the patentability require-
ments. 
4. MGRs and the FAO International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources 
for Food and Agriculture Model 
The last workable model for MGRs’ management to examine is the In-
ternational Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
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(“ITPGRFA”).204 It pursues the same objectives as the CBD, even if its 
field of application ratione materiae is narrower, i.e. only plant genetic 
resources for food and agriculture.205 
The treaty establishes the Multilateral System, set forth in Article 
10,206 which aims at facilitating access to genetic resources and providing 
for the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from their use.207 
Pursuant to Article 12, genetic materials can be accessed by legal and 
natural persons only through the Multilateral System. Access is provided 
for the purpose of utilization and conservation for research, breeding, and 
training for food and agriculture, so long as the use does not include 
chemical, pharmaceutical, and/or other nonfood/feed industrial uses.208 
Recipients cannot claim any intellectual property or other rights that limit 
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access to the resources from the Multilateral System, or their genetic 
parts or components.209 
Pursuant to Article 12.4, access to genetic resources and benefit shar-
ing shall be governed by agreements entered into by the interested legal 
or natural persons, acting as providers and recipients, in accordance with 
the Standard Material Transfer Agreement (“SMTA”).210 The content of 
the SMTA complies with the ITPGRFA’s relevant provisions. Indeed, it 
states that the provider shall accord access to genetic resources expedi-
tiously. On the other hand, the recipient shall undertake that the re-
sources accessed be used or conserved only for the purposes allowed by 
ITPGRFA. SMTA also states that, if the recipient commercializes a 
product incorporating genetic resources covered by the Multilateral Sys-
tem, he/she shall pay a fixed percentage of the sales into the mechanism 
established by the Governing Body for this purpose (the Trust Fund, or 
Trust Account),211 or according to alternative payment schemes defined 
within the SMTA.212 Articles 13 of ITPGRFA and 6.9 of SMTA set forth 
additional terms, including but not limited to, such requirements that the 
recipient: make all nonconfidential information that results from research 
and development carried out on the resources supplied available to the 
Multilateral System; share nonmonetary benefits that result from such 
research and development; and facilitate access to technologies for con-
servation and use of genetic resources.213 
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Therefore, the ITPGRFA provides a workable model for MGRs and a 
useful compromise for the drafting of a specific legal regime.214 The ob-
ligations established by the ITPGRFA, if applied with the necessary ad-
justments to MGRs, would guarantee that the prior and informed consent 
and the fair and equitable benefit-sharing obligations are enforced. First-
ly, creating a centralized system, such as the Multilateral System, ap-
pointed with the task of overseeing the access to MGRs and the equitable 
sharing of the benefits arising from the commercialization of the prod-
ucts based on them, would guarantee that equitable outcomes are 
reached. In contrast to the mutually agreed-upon terms required by the 
CBD, the content of which is left to the discretion of the parties, the 
standardization of the material transfer agreements and their negotiations 
under competent authority supervision, such as the Governing Body, 
would ensure that equitable results are obtained.215 Secondly, following 
the position of those who propose that “the benefits associated with the 
exploitation of genetic resources of the deep sea could be shared by es-
tablishing a form of trust fund from royalties or other fees collected from 
developers of biotechnology derived from hydrothermal vents on the 
high seas,”216 a “trust fund” for payments received could be instituted as 
a means for guaranteeing the enforcement of the benefit-sharing obliga-
tion. 
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B. Institutional Solutions 
1. Attributing a Primary Role to the Authority 
The legal solutions call for an institutional mechanism that has compe-
tence over the MGRs in areas beyond national jurisdiction and that can 
take the role of “national state” for application of CBD principles and to 
the eventual entry into force of the Nagoya Protocol. Some suggest that 
the Authority should be the governing international body for MGRs.217 
Due to the fact that the commercial value of MGRs was unknown by 
UNCLOS negotiators and that in 1970 the U.N. General Assembly de-
clared all the Area the common heritage of mankind beyond its mineral 
resources, MGRs can thus fall within the common heritage regime.218 
This “dynamic” interpretation of UNCLOS would be in conformity with 
the principles embodied in the preamble of the convention. However, as 
demonstrated above, the common heritage regime provided by Part XI 
applies only to MGRs located on the soil of the Area; the MGRs located 
in the water column cannot come within such legal framework. This dis-
tinction leads to a confusion when attempting to create a comprehensive 
legal regime because, firstly, the distinction between MGRs on the floor 
or in the subsoil of the Area and those in the water column is not easy, 
and secondly, retaining the differentiation based on location would create 
a fragmented legal regime rather than a unique regime addressing MGRs 
in their entirety. 
To address this complication, an amendment that would support a dy-
namic interpretation of UNCLOS text as far as the mandate of the Au-
thority is concerned has been suggested.219 As it stands, the composition 
of the Authority is oriented towards the mineral industry.220 A change in 
the Authority’s makeup has to be decided either by amendment or 
through a second agreement for the implementation of Part XI.221 This 
would demand an unlikely diplomatic effort in light of the contrasting 
positions supported by UNCLOS states parties and the above mentioned 
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doctrinal debates on MGRs’ legal status. Moreover, such a solution 
would also exclude states that are not parties to UNCLOS, but who still 
have an interest in MGRs. Conversely, it might induce nonparties to rati-
fy the convention. In terms of institutional economics, this solution is 
interesting because it builds on an existing system and an existing struc-
ture. 
However, the Authority is not party to the CBD and cannot become 
one; according to Article 34, only states and regional economic integra-
tion organizations can become parties.222 For the time being, it is the only 
existing body having some jurisdiction in the field of MGRs and, in par-
ticular, it has the right and duty to “adopt appropriate rules, regulations 
and procedures for inter alia . . . the protection and conservation of the 
natural resources of the Area and the prevention of damage to the flora 
and fauna of the marine environment.”223 However, the Authority is 
called upon to play a role in assessing the environmental impact of ac-
tivities and processes only in the Area, and as such, the water column 
still remains outside its authority. 
Nevertheless, mining activities may have an impact on ecosystems in 
the Area and thus on MGRs.224 Stakeholders interested in the exploita-
tion of such resources (both states and private actors) should support the 
involvement of the Authority in the concrete management of the MGRs, 
which by default implies its involvement in the broader debate.225 The 
Authority, with its competences and co-operative role,226 should be one 
of the institutions called upon to manage the exploitation of MGRs. 
Problems of coordination between international institutions may still 
arise because of possible overlaps of control. The Nagoya Protocol offers 
a suitable, even if weak, solution, in stating that “[d]ue regard should be 
paid to useful and relevant ongoing work or practices under [other inter-
national instruments relevant to this Protocol] and relevant international 
organizations.”227 For creating and implementing a Global Multilateral 
Benefit-Sharing Mechanism for MGRs, parties would have to take into 
consideration the work and practices of the Authority.228 
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Some more problems may however come up when not all the parties to 
one agreement (for instance a future agreement on MGRs) are parties to 
other agreements (including CBD, UNCLOS, or TRIPS). An inter-
systemic approach and a systemic interpretation of the relevant provi-
sions might then be the solution. 
2. Implementation Agreements or Management Convention Alternatives 
Two alternative options exist in which the Authority is part of the de-
bate but not “the one and only” for the management of MGRs. Firstly, 
states could adopt an implementation agreement, following the example 
of the 1995 United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
December 10, 1982, relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (“Straddling 
Stocks Agreement”).229 A second option would be the adoption of an ad 
hoc convention for the management and the protection of MGRs in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction. Both solutions are supported by the Nagoya 
Protocol which asks future parties to consider “the need for and modali-
ties of a global multilateral benefit-sharing mechanism to address the fair 
and equitable sharing of benefits derived from the utilization of genetic 
resources . . . for which it is not possible to grant or obtain prior informed 
consent.”230 A specialized instrument might contain such a mechanism 
and would likewise be consistent with the Nagoya Protocol.231 
(a) The Possibility of an Implementation Agreement 
Some authors suggest studying the Area regime and the Straddling 
Stocks Agreement in parallel, in order to delineate a feasible and viable 
regime for MGRs in areas beyond national jurisdiction.232 Both regimes 
are leges speciales in respect to the high seas general regime in the sense 
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that the latter does not apply when the former does. Moreover, they both 
deal with the management, protection, and exploitation of natural re-
sources and both create systems of control based on international institu-
tions. However, the Straddling Stocks Agreement relies on sub-regional 
and regional organizations differing from the Area centralized system. 
Considering that MGRs are renewable resources, and that their variety 
might be better protected at a regional or sub-regional level, the Strad-
dling Stocks Agreement option is of some interest. It presents a pragmat-
ic solution as it depends on regional organizations, and would hopefully 
guarantee an effective protection due to the proximity of the competent 
organ with both the MGRs and the state or private actor interested in 
their exploitation. This option can also have lower costs for coastal states 
of regional seas where governance bodies already exist. This is perfectly 
in line with Recommendation XI/8 of the SBSTTA,233 which: 
urges Parties and other States to cooperate within the relevant interna-
tional and/or regional organizations in order to promote the conserva-
tion, management and sustainable use of marine biodiversity in areas 
beyond national jurisdiction, including deep seabed genetic re-
sources.234 
Presumably, this solution would also promote a direct involvement of 
the industry and private actors that operate in the considered regional 
area. Consequently, this solution could better promote the particular in-
terests of a region. 
However, some drawbacks of such a decentralized system persist. In 
particular, protection regimes could become unduly fragmented. Compli-
ance with and enforcement of international obligations would be entrust-
ed to a regional or sub-regional body through the conclusion of an 
agreement by the interested states. The powers given to this body can 
vary in strength and the means allocated likewise can vary in efficiency 
for guaranteeing the protection of MGRs. This possible fragmentation of 
protection could undermine the “common” dimension of MGRs man-
agement and exploitation in areas beyond national jurisdiction. 
(b) Creating a Convention for the Management and Protection of MGRs 
Another possibility is the creation of a unified regime for MGRs be-
yond national borders by an ad hoc agreement that regulates all the rele-
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vant aspects (protection, management, and exploitation). This agreement 
would also create an institution, such as an international organization, to 
take charge of enforcement. This new agreement would be a sort of 
“CBD for MGRs.” It would complement the actual CBD and UNCLOS 
by providing a unique regime for MGRs, independent of their location in 
the water column or on the Area, and by guaranteeing machinery similar 
to the Authority but open to representation by other interests. 
The creation of a centralized body by the ad hoc agreement would es-
tablish an authority in charge of granting access to and managing the 
benefit sharing among states and private actors interested in activities 
beyond national jurisdiction. This new institution could be a Multilateral 
System for MGRs, inspired by the FAO example mentioned above. The 
main difference with the FAO Multilateral System would be that this 
new institution would also be party to agreements regulating the activi-
ties concluded with states party or private investors. Thus, all contracts 
should have a “public” dimension in the interest of including the partici-
pation of this institution. Accordingly, the new machinery should be 
closer to the Area regime than the FAO Multilateral System concerning 
the contractual aspects. 
The creation of a centralized body has the advantage of guaranteeing 
uniform protection and uniform standards for the exploitation of MGRs. 
In theory, it would guarantee a “common” management of the MGRs, 
less influenced by particular or regional interests. The establishment of 
such an institution and machinery would, however, come at an economi-
cal cost for state parties. The conclusion of such an agreement would be 
reached only after a determination of the commercial worth of biotech 
products deriving from MGRs. Only then is it likely that states would be 
keen to regulate their protection and management and determine their 
legal status and common use. 
It is also necessary to consider that this agreement would be situated in 
an already crowded legal environment; its links and relationships with 
the other instruments would have to be discussed and regulated. In par-
ticular, it would be useful to create links with the CBD, UNCLOS, and 
TRIPS to create “legal gateways” between the texts (compatibility claus-
es and, eventually, recalls of the existing agreements in the new one) and 
links between the regimes. The latter suggestion could consist, for exam-
ple, of a system for the exchange of information and data between the 
technical organs of each regime or in a mechanism for the participation 
of technical organs of one regime in the meetings of the others. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The first part demonstrates how several legal instruments overlap when 
it comes to the governance of MGRs. While they stand in a relationship 
of interdependence, also of complementarity and mutual support, they 
manage MGRs inadequately and inefficiently. That is the reason why an 
ad hoc regime for the management and exploitation of MGRs should be 
adopted. 
To the extent that MGRs are considered to be global commons (if not 
part of the common heritage of mankind) ethical and moral concerns 
cannot be left out and ought to be taken into consideration in the creation 
of a regulatory framework for MGRs and their exploitation.235 As it 
stands, the law of the sea plays the role of “equalizer” among maritime 
nations of the world.236 UNCLOS specifically creates mechanisms for 
balancing interests and sometimes redistributing benefits deriving from 
maritime economic activities.237 Therefore, any future legal regime for 
MGRs cannot ignore the role of the law of the sea. 
Each solution explored above brings with it useful features for putting 
together the future regime. One main conclusion can be drawn: a com-
promise between IPRs’ protection and MGRs’ management can only be 
realized via a new instrument, either a protocol or an annex to an existing 
instrument, or an ad hoc agreement, creating an institutional machinery 
for guaranteeing prior and informed access to MGRs and fair and equita-
ble benefit sharing. It might in the end indeed be suitable to have a 
“common heritage without mentioning it.” 238 
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